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Abstract
Biomedical advances nowadays enable physicians to keep patients hovering at the brink of death
for many years. These new technologies have evoked challenging ethical dilemmas that test
society’s moral resources. But some have been unwilling to patiently search for new moral
wisdom, believing a bold stance is required and they are using legal means to achieve their goal.
Attempts to legalize physician assisted suicide and euthanasia are one example, and the literature
is replete with analyses of these practices. Far less attention has been paid to opposite attempts at
legally enforcing life-sustaining medical interventions. In the mid 1990s, a group called
"Nebraskans for Humane Care" sought to amend the Nebraska Constitution to require that
nutrition and hydration is administered to any person and with any means available. In this
article, the history behind and the text of the proposed amendment is critically analyzed, revealing
the serious consequences that adoption of such legal regulation of medical treatment can have.
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Pitfalls of Legal Regulations to Improve End-of-Life Care
Never before in the history of mankind have advanced societies been able to keep
people hovering at the brink of death for many years, even decades, unable to sustain
themselves, kept alive only by advanced medical technologies. These new technologies have
evoked very complex and challenging ethical dilemmas that test society’s moral resources.
With it, the ethical question has arisen whether the fact that one can do so, also means that
one morally must do so. This is a most challenging ethical question, which has put society’s
moral resources to the test. Thus, many contemporary patients, their physicians, family
members and care givers are searching for moral truth, planning, pondering, and praying.
But some have been unwilling to seek patiently, believing a bold stance is required.
There are those who argue that physicians, having created the problem of patients hovering
between life and death, should provide patients with an expedient way out, either by assisting
in patients’ suicides or by assuming final responsibility and actually ending patients’ lives.
The states of Oregon and Washington have legalized physician assisted suicide (PAS),
Belgium legalized euthanasia, and the Netherlands decriminalized both. Then there are those
who believe this answer is contrary to the fundamental dignity and sacredness of human life.
They do not believe human life is ever not worth living, shun discussions about forgoing lifesustaining medical treatments, and have, likewise, resorted to the law to propel their
perspective. In the case of Terri Schiavo, her parents managed to continue the provision of
medically administered nutrition and hydration for approximately seven years by fighting its
withdrawal in court (Cerminara & Goodman, 2006). In the second half of this decade, a
group called “Nebraskans for Humane Care Committee” sought to amend the constitution of
the State of Nebraska, requiring, by force of law, that nutrition and hydration in principle is
administered to any person and with any means available.
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This article reviews the Nebraska proposal, submitting both the text of the amendment
and the political process that surrounded this event to close scrutiny. This amendment was
admittedly a rather local initiative, concerning only the 1.7 million inhabitants of the State of
Nebraska. Moreover, in the end, it did not become positive law. However, the ethical
discussion of that initiative serves two larger purposes. First, the examination of the
amendment text itself shows that it is truly difficult to write good laws about end-of-life
medical care. Although this author – and everybody else known to this author – has failed to
gain first-hand insight in the intentions of the individuals who wrote this particular
amendment, for they have steadfastly refused to answer all inquiries, there is no reason to
believe that they intended the potential harms entailed in this amendment. Instead, these
dangers are largely the result of the limitations of the legislative endeavor itself.
Second, this review of the legislative process will show that this amendment was not a
peculiarly Nebraskan idiosyncrasy. Instead, it appears that Nebraska was simply a testing
ground for a political experiment, conceived of and operationalized by individuals and
agencies, none of which were Nebraskan. The analysis serves to underscore the more general
caveat against relying on legal means to resolve urgent and complex medical-ethical
quandaries, such as those evoked by emerging medical treatments and life-sustaining
technologies.
As mentioned, the proponents of this Nebraskan initiative refused to engage in public
or private discussions about the proposed amendment. Consequently, the analyses of this
HCA presented here are inevitably biased by the perspectives that have been voiced in a
variety of media by opponents of the amendment. The virtual absence of public comments
and explanations by those individuals who have first-hand knowledge about this initiative has
also rendered it difficult to provide a complete and verifiable rendering of the facts.
The 2006 Petition Drive
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In the summer of 2006, a large number of signature collectors went in search of
registered voters who might be willing to support a proposal to amend the Constitution of the
State of Nebraska. Specifically, the amendment would add a new section 30 entitled
“Humane Care.” The goal was to collect sufficient signatures to have the Humane Care
Amendment (HCA) included on the ballot for the elections slated for November of that same
year.
The HCA’s full title, “To Amend Article I of the Constitution of Nebraska by adding
a new section 30: Humane Care,” probably sufficed to sway a good number of Nebraskans.
After all, who is against humane care? It is unknown what additional explanation the
signature collectors would give next to persuade the hesitant citizen. However, the text of the
official “object clause” that was printed right below the amendment’s title is as follows:
This measure would humanely protect any person, regardless of race, religion
or ethnicity, age, disability or gender, from the withholding of food or water
by any institution with a legal duty of care (such as a hospital, orphanage,
prison or nursing home) if the withholding of that nourishment could
reasonably result in death from dehydration or starvation. This measure allows
for honoring the will of any person who has expressly requested withholding
food and water under specific conditions or delegated to relatives that
decision, by means of a valid advance directive given previous. (Nebraskans
for Humane Care Committee 2006b)
The object clause contains two sentences. The first describes what the amendment
would require if accepted. When reduced to its essence, this sentence reads: “This measure
would humanely protect any person .... from the withholding of food or water .... if the
withholding ... could reasonably result in death from dehydration or starvation.”
The supposed “humaneness” of the amendment is underscored once more by the
fourth word, immediately followed by the claim that the amendment actually “protects”
people from some sort of harm. The harm turns out to be a deprivation (“withholding”) of a
good, indeed a very basic good (i.e., food and water). Apparently – for otherwise there
would not have been a need to amend the Constitution – health care providers in the State of
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Nebraska so often deprive patients from these basic goods that a most forceful measure is in
order, that is, a constitutional amendment. Fear is sown. The sentence ends by adding more
fuel to the flame: If the petition fails, people may end up dying “from dehydration or
starvation.” The same frightening language (and worse) surfaced on the website of the
Nebraskans for Humane Care Committee (NHCC) which sponsored the amendment
(Nebraskans for Humane Care Committee 2006b).
The second sentence of the object clause, in contrast, appeals to the value of
individual freedom of choice, a building block of American culture that is particularly dear to
many citizens of the State of Nebraska. The object clause assures those voters who are
suspicious of any government interference with their own health care that their choices will
be respected, including a refusal of food and water.
The combination of the title, object clause, and any explanation added by the
signature collectors themselves is likely to have been sufficient to persuade most of the
137,000 signatories. Few people would have read the full text of the HCA, which is a dense
and potentially confounding piece of legal writing:
The fundamental human right to food and water should not be denied to any
person, regardless of race, religion, ethnicity, nativity, disability, age, state of
health, gender or other characteristic: No entity with a legal duty of care for a
person within its custody (including a hospital, orphanage, foster home,
nursing home, sanitarium, skilled nursing facility, prison, jail, detainment
center, corporation, business, institution or individual) may refuse, deny, or
fail to provide food and water sustenance and nourishment, however delivered,
to any such person if death or grave physical harm could reasonably result
from such withholding and the person at risk can metabolize. Any such person
so threatened with dehydration or starvation, any relative of such person, such
person’s legal guardian or surrogate, any public official with appropriate
jurisdiction, or any protection and advocacy or ombudsman agency shall have
legal standing to bring an action for injunctive relief, damages and reasonable
attorney’s fees to uphold this standard of humane care. This section does not
prohibit honoring the will of any person who, by means of a valid advance
directive record, has fully, expressly, and personally either authorized the
withholding of food or water from himself or herself under specific conditions,
or delegated that decision, under specific conditions, to one or more relatives
or to another person unrelated to the entity with a legal duty of care.
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What is worse, the actual amendment does not quite live up to the assurances included
in the object clause. As will be shown shortly, instead of the benefits guaranteed by the first
sentence of the object clause, the text of the amendment actually entails many harms. And the
respect for patient’s autonomy promised in the second sentence is severely restricted by the
amendment itself. And yet it is the amendment, not the object clause, that would have
become law if adopted.
Ethical Analysis of the Proposed Amendment
The 226 word HCA consists of three sentences only, each delineating a distinct part
of the HCA. The first part describes the specific behavior that is to be prohibited. The
second part enumerates who has the power to seek enforcement of that prohibition. And the
third part lists some exceptions to the prohibition. This analysis commences with Part 2
because it is largely procedural in nature and, as such, the least controversial of the three.
Subsequently, Part 1 will be examined, which is ethically the most problematic. Finally, it
will be shown that patients’ freedom of choice ultimately is much more limited than Part 3
appears to promise.
Part 2: Legal Force
The middle sentence of the HCA in essence outlines who is authorized to take legal
action to enforce the proscribed behavior, or to seek damages if it has been violated:
Any such person so threatened with dehydration or starvation, any relative of
such person, such person’s legal guardian or surrogate, any public official with
appropriate jurisdiction, or any protection and advocacy or ombudsman
agency shall have legal standing to bring an action for injunctive relief,
damages and reasonable attorney’s fees to uphold this standard of humane
care.
Expectedly, the first person included in this list is the patient. It is equally reasonable
to include in this list “such person’s legal guardian or surrogate,” in case the patient has
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become incompetent and is no longer able to protect his or her rights. Whereas this legal
representative could be a family member, it does not have to be one.
But the amendment actually allows any patient relative to act as a self-appointed
advocate. This is consistent with the absence in Nebraska end-of-care law of a so-called
“familial consent” statute that would have regulated the order in which relatives may decide
on behalf of incompetent family members in the absence of a legally appointed surrogate. At
odds with Nebraska law, however, is the HCA’s allowing such a relative, even a very distant
one, to intervene while the patient is still perfectly competent to make health care decisions.
Or if the patient has become incompetent, this relative may come forward to contradict the
patient’s legally appointed surrogate. The fact that any relative of such person is so
authorized can easily result in a single relative upsetting a carefully negotiated palliative care
plan for grandmother, even if it happens to be a distant cousin with an ax to grind against one
of the other family members, or the estranged son who now converts his deep sense of guilt
into a dramatic demand that every life-sustaining treatment is tried. This increases the chance
of family in-fighting and communication breakdowns, already a prevalent problem in end-oflife care planning (Lang & Quill, 2004; Swetz, Crowley, Hook & Mueller, 2007; Winter &
Parks, 2008).
To this already expansive list of authorized individuals are added three groups of
“third persons.” Mentioned first is (a) “any public official with appropriate jurisdiction”. The
state most certainly has a justifiable interest in human life and must pay particular attention to
the protection of vulnerable individuals who are unable to safeguard their own rights.
Unfortunately, there are also ample examples of state officials, such as attorneys general,
having intervened in the decision-making processes surrounding patients’ end-of-life care,
insisting on the continued artificial nutrition and hydration (AN&H) regardless whether such
continuation was medically indicated or even if it caused the patient “grotesque harm”
The Online Journal of Health Ethics Volume 6, No. 1 July, 2010
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according to the physicians involved, as happened in the case of Sheila Pouliot (Ouellette,
2004).
Whereas the first category of individuals empowered by the HCA to intervene is
restricted by the limiting clause “with appropriate jurisdiction,” the second and third
categories are very broadly defined, giving license to (b) any protection and advocacy agency
and (c) any ombudsman agency. Because the HCA does not define what justifies such a
label, a small group of vitalist crusaders that calls itself a protection agency could qualify or
even the company that manufactures the machinery for artificial nutrition could qualify when
it presents itself as an advocacy agency.
Part 2 is also problematic for a very different reason, that is, the language used. The
HCA references the person “so threatened with dehydration or starvation.” As pointed out
earlier in the discussion of the object clause, these are all very negative terms. The word
“threat” suggests a serious danger. “Dehydration” and, even more so, “starvation” connotes
severe suffering. Because of that connotation, it is impossible to argue against it. Physicians
cannot defend their proposal to stop artificial nutrition in terms of “I favor starving your
mother”. What needs to be determined in any given case is whether such a withdrawal of the
AN&H does indeed equate to starvation as that process is commonly understood. If it is, it is
necessarily immoral. But if it is not, it may well be a moral course. To simply label it as a
form of starvation begs the question. The same is true when the text of the HCA next
contrasts the alleged threat with “this standard of humane care.” If administration of AN&H
is indeed “humane care” in all circumstances, one is ethically obligated to provide it. But
whether in fact it is always humane, is exactly what is at stake.
Part 1: The Main Provision
The main part of the HCA is contained in the first sentence. This lengthy
sentence itself consists of four parts:
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[1.1] “The fundamental human right to food and water should not be denied to
any person…
[1.2] No [caregiver] … may refuse, deny, or fail to provide food and water
sustenance and nourishment,
[1.3] however delivered, …
[1.4] if death or grave physical harm could reasonably result from such
withholding and the person at risk can metabolize.” [numbers added]
Part [1.1] casts the provision of food and water in rights language and assigns each
Nebraskan a right to these goods. This raises the question whether Nebraskans currently do
not have such a right. In fact, they already do. The existence of such a right is evidenced by
various other laws, such as the “Rights of the Terminally Ill Act”. This Act, which regulates
living wills, in Section 20-408 stipulates that these regulations “…shall not affect the
responsibility of the attending physician or other health care provider to provide treatment,
including nutrition and hydration, for a patient's comfort care or alleviation of pain.” Even
more explicitly, Section 30-3426 of the Nebraska Revised Statutes insists that “[a power of
attorney document will not impact a patient’s]… right to …the usual and typical provision of
nutrition and hydration.”
The authors of the HCA could counter that the amendment wishes to underscore that
this right to food and water is a “fundamental” right. But that language raises more questions
than it answers. Most importantly, the wording would imply that every human person has this
right and not just terminally ill patients. Given that many millions of US citizens suffer from
chronic hunger, one could argue that this amendment tasks the state to make available much
needed nutrition and hydration for them, even though this was most surely not intended by
the drafters of the HCA.

The Online Journal of Health Ethics Volume 6, No. 1 July, 2010

PITFALLS OF LEGAL REGULATIONS

10

More troublesome is the amendment’s limiting itself to food and water as stipulated
twice in both [1.1] and [1.2]. Why this limitation? Why, for example, are patients not given a
right to oxygen? Chemically, oxygen is as much needed as carbohydrates. One cannot
metabolize carbohydrates without oxygen. And it would be unconvincing to argue that
suffocation from lack of oxygen is more “humane” than starvation. Along similar lines, one
has to wonder why dialysis is not included. From a biological perspective, equally important
as the uptake of nutrients is the removal of toxic waste from the body.
More troublesome yet are the methods of delivery mentioned in part [1.3]. In effect,
the HCA does not specify appropriate methods of delivering nutrition and hydration, but
mandates that care givers use any method available (“…, however delivered, …”). This
would suggest that not only common china and silverware are to be used to assist patients
who cannot eat themselves, but also intravenous lines and tubes, in short, medical means of
administration. Moreover, the HCA does not rule out the use of a funnel either, nor the use of
force or restraints when patients object to the caregivers’ feeding efforts. Yet, if patients with
Alzheimer’s dementia are confused by the feeding tube and continue to pull it out it, it would
seem less humane to strap them down for the remainder of their days than to allow nutritional
deficiencies to occur.
Part [1.4] spells out the conditions under which AN&H must be administered. This
part of the sentence contains three Boolean connectors (IF, AND, OR), leading to the
following break-down (see Figure 1).

Figure 1
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This break-down makes clear that a necessary condition of legally mandated nutrition
is the person’s ability to metabolize. But what does “metabolize” mean? When used in the
context of biology, as it is here, to metabolize means to “process chemically”.
Metabolization is an ongoing process in every cell of the human body. Parts of the human
body, such as the skin, continue to metabolize even after the person’s death. This would lead
to the conclusion that even if the person is dying, when all organ systems are shutting down
and the body is itself resisting more food and water intake, but is still metabolizing, the
patient must be force-fed. One can only wonder whether the drafters of the HCA intended
that conclusion. Ultimately the problem is linguistic. Trying to capture the complexity of
human dying in a single term inevitably will lead to dangerous simplifications.
In addition to the patient still metabolizing, the HCA demands that one of two other
conditions be met. The first of these is that “death could reasonably result from such
withholding …” This stipulation is odd because artificial nutrition and hydration is only
indicated when patients cannot eat or be fed orally; not feeding these patients will inevitably
result in their death. Remarkably, the HCA does not say: “…if death could reasonably result
sooner from such withholding…” So a patient who has three weeks left to live with or
without AN&H must still be force-fed. At least, the federal Baby Doe Amendment from
1985, which was intended to protect severely disabled newborns from medical abandonment,
only requires the administration of “appropriate” nutrition and hydration, which “in the
treating physician’s (or physicians’) reasonable medical judgment, will be most likely to be
effective in ameliorating or correcting all such [life-threatening] conditions” (45 C.F.R. §
1340.15 Services and treatment for disabled infants; Moss, 1987). No such provision is
included in Nebraska’s HCA.
Alternatively, food and water must be administered “if ... grave physical harm could
…result from such withholding.” The amendment, thus, is only concerned with harm that
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may happen if food and water is not given. It is not concerned with what harm may happen if
food and water is given. The HCA reflects – and appeals to – commonly held fears of dying
from dehydration and starvation. It is these fears that make hunger strikes powerful political
instruments. But the HCA fails to acknowledge that many patients who are dying no longer
desire food or water, and choose to severely limit or altogether forego their food intake,
reporting no lasting sense of hunger (Winter, 2000). This makes sense because the dying
body biologically no longer has much use of new nutrients. It is even uncertain that
terminally ill patients will live longer if they are fed artificially; no improvement in survival
has been found so far in either patients with advanced cancer or those with advanced
dementia (Gillick, 2000; Garrow et al 2007; Hallenbach, 2002; Mitchell, 2007).
The HCA furthermore fails to take into account the harms that can result from
forcefully administering food and water. These range from discomfort from the feeding tubes
and lines, to abdominal pain, nausea, and vomiting, particularly in the case of intestinal
obstructions. By now, it has also become clear that artificial nutrition, particularly in patients
with advanced Alzheimer’s dementia, places the patient at a significant risk of pneumonia
(food pumped into the intestinal system makes its way from the stomach back up the
esophagus and the down the trachea into the lungs); thus, the artificial nutrition may actually
shorten patients’ lives. Forced administration of fluids, likewise, can be harmful. A fluid
overload can result in swelling of legs, abdomen and other body parts; in extreme situations
the body may try to get rid of the unneeded fluids by weeping through the skin. The extra
fluid can also induce congestive heart failure and difficulty breathing from water retained in
the lungs. In effect, the patient may end up drowning (Casarett, Kapo & Caplan 2005; Cervo,
Bryan & Farber, 2006; Geppert, Andrews,& Druyan, 2010; Mitchell, 2007). It is difficult to
see how such a death can be considered humane.
Part 3: The Patient’s Will
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The third part is intended to grant a legal way out to those who wish not to be treated
as described above. It allows health care providers to honor:
the will of any person who
[3.1]

by means of a valid advance directive record,

[3.2]

has fully, expressly, and personally

[3.3a] either authorized the withholding of food or water from himself or herself
under specific conditions,
[3.3b] or delegated that decision, under specific conditions, to one or more relatives
or to another person unrelated to the entity with a legal duty of care [numbers
added].
This section appears to provide those unwilling to be force-fed ample opportunities
for making their wishes known. But on closer inspection, patients’ choices are actually quite
limited. The HCA could have simply stated what is contained in [3.3a] and nothing more.
This would still have been a digression from standard medical ethics and law. For a patient
does not have to authorize the forgoing of treatment before it may be stopped; rather, the
patient must consent to treatment before it can be initiated or continued. But at least it would
not have limited the means by which patients can withhold their consent. Instead, the HCA in
[3.1] specifies exactly how a patient can do so, namely by means of an advance directive
record (AD). There are two kinds of ADs: living wills (in which the patient provides consent
to medical treatment – or withholds such consent – in advance of becoming incompetent),
and power of attorney documents (in which the patient authorizes another person to provide a
substitute consent – or withhold it – in advance of becoming incompetent). The manner in
which Part 3 is phrased makes clear that [3.3a] and [3.3b] are the two advance directives
already listed in [3.1].
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When a law specifically states which methods can be used to refuse artificial nutrition
and hydration, other methods are thereby disallowed. For if the legislators had intended to
allow other methods of refusal as well, they would have included those in the list of approved
means. This is the same as a mother telling her son that he may color the side-walk using
chalk or water paint. If she had not listed any methods, all methods would have been
potentially admissible. But by listing only two methods of coloring, spray paint and all other
methods were thereby excluded. Likewise, the HCA, by specifically listing ADs as the means
of expressing one’s refusal of treatment, thereby excluded all other methods.
The consequences of this exclusion are troubling. For it means that only people who
have issued an AD – a mere one-third of Nebraska’s population according to the latest
statistics (Nebraska Coalition for Compassionate Care, 2004; Nebraska Hospice and
Palliative Care Partnership, 2007) – may be spared the kinds of suffering described above if
they end up suffering from Alzheimer’s dementia and are force-fed. And they would only be
spared such fate if they happen to have addressed artificial nutrition and hydration
specifically in their AD, as required by the applicable Nebraska statutes. Furthermore, people
who never were able to issue an AD are always going to be force-fed. This includes patients
who are minors or who have been incompetent from birth because of mental disability. For
the HCA does not allow parents, guardians, or other proxies to make decisions regarding
artificial nutrition and hydration on behalf of these vulnerable patient populations. Finally,
one has to wonder what the rights of competent adults are under the HCA. An AD only takes
effect once the patient becomes incompetent. It would appear that the authors of the HCA
even wanted to curtail the right of competent adults to withhold consent for these medical
interventions.
It is quite remarkable that this kind of curtailment of individual rights had any chance
of passing in the State of Nebraska (Furlong, 2007). Many of the 137,000 signers of the
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petition may not have realized what the HCA’s implications actually were and might have
been shocked to learn what they just signed in favor of. Indeed, the question arises who was
behind the petition drive. As mentioned, the petition was formally initiated by a group called
“Nebraskans for Humane Care Committee.” But who were the members of this new group
that appeared to have been created solely for the purposes of this amendment?
The Origins and Fate of the Amendment
Nebraska is home to two medical centers (one of which is Catholic), each with
medical, dental, nursing, pharmacy and health sciences schools, as well as units specifically
dedicated to the study of health care ethics and policy. But as it turned out, as far as this
author could determine, none of their departments or faculty members were involved in this
initiative or even consulted. Neither were professors in the state’s two law schools. Nor were
any of the state’s professional organizations, including the Nebraska Hospice and Palliative
Care Partnership, which has significantly improved humane end-of-life care in the state. If no
academic and no health care institution or association was behind or even consulted in the
drafting of the HCA, was it maybe initiated by a faith-based organization? Given Pope John
Paul II’s 2004 address and subsequent statements from Roman Catholic authorities such as
the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith (2007), confirming the Pope’s statement that
nutrition and hydration in principle must always be administered using advanced medical
technologies if necessary (Bradley 2009), maybe the HCA originated at the Nebraska
Catholic Conference's Pro Life Office? But the HCA did it not originate there either; the
Office wasn’t even consulted but simply presented with a fait accompli: The amendment was
ready to go, and the bishops were merely given the choice to be either in favor or against the
initiative (Aksamit, 2006).
If apparently no known entity inside of the State of Nebraska was the driving force
behind this initiative, where did it originate? Attorney Thomas Mann, the sole identified inThe Online Journal of Health Ethics Volume 6, No. 1 July, 2010
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state representative of the Nebraskans for Humane Care Committee, consistently refused to
answer questions. Inquiries left on the NHCC electronic contact form, likewise, were met
with deafening silence. This experience was shared by any and all Nebraskans who were
concerned about the HCA and trying to find out who was behind the initiative and why.
The only published accounts on the origins of the HCA appear to be the research
undertaken by Hart Williams (2006), who published his findings on his website, and by
journalists Nichole Aksamit and Paul Goodsell (2006) of the Omaha World Herald (OWH)
newspaper. Based on these two sources, it appears that the amendment was drafted by several
out-of-state lawyers, including Steven Safranek (who at the time was a professor of law at the
Catholic Ave Maria University in Michigan), and Wesley Smith (a lawyer from California
who has written extensively about end-of-life care from a Catholic perspective). Smith has
confirmed his involvement in the drafting process in a 2006 blog (Smith, 2006). When
interviewed by the OWH journalists, both of these legal scholars insisted that the amendment
was not conceived by them, and neither appeared to know exactly where it originated and
why this initiative was targeted at the State of Nebraska. As argued above, state law already
acknowledges the right of Nebraskans to receive nutrition and hydration when medically
indicated.
Using publicly available campaign statements, made available by the Nebraska
Accountability and Disclosure Committee (2006), both Williams and the OWH journalists
followed the money trail, seeking to uncover who had financed the document preparation and
the collection of the more than 137,000 signatures. The fact that large sums of money are
donated to advance a particular moral view on end-of-life care through political means in and
of itself is not unusual. Eisenberg (2005) has traced the funds that enabled the family of Terri
Schiavo to protract their legal fight for many years. Conversely, the recent 58%-42% vote in
favor of legalizing physician assisted suicide in the State of Washington (Washington
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Secretary of State, 2009) may have been the result of advocates’ access to $4.3 million
whereas opponents had to make do with only $1.6 million in funds raised (Public Disclosure
Commission, 2009). What renders the Nebraska situation rather unusual are the geographical
locations of the financiers and their apparent lack of interest in the HCA itself.
Williams and the OWH journalists discovered that all of the funds were funneled to
Nebraska via an organization called “America at Its Best,” which is located in the State of
Montana. Mr. Laird Maxwell of Boise, Idaho, who heads this organization, explained to the
OWH journalists that the amendment was not his idea, but pitched to him. Nor did he know
why Nebraska. In fact, he appeared not to even know attorney Thomas Mann, the single
identified Nebraskan involved whose name was on the petition as the official contact person.
Since “America at Its Best” only funneled the funds, the source had to be elsewhere.
The OWH traced the money back to various donors in two more states, Virginia and New
York. But the bulk of the funds ($835,000) turned out to be donated by “Americans for
Limited Government” (ALG), located in Chicago, Illinois. Paradoxically, this organization’s
principle purpose is to reduce the size of federal, state and local governments across the
nation. Its president, John Tillman, insisted that ALG did not have a specific position on the
issue of artificial nutrition and hydration; indeed, he had not even read the amendment
(Aksamit & Goodsell, 2006). Likewise, Mr. Eric O'Keefe, chairman of ALG's Executive
Committee, explained that the ALG had donated funds to support two amendments, the HCA
and the proposal to cap state spending (“Stop Over Spending Nebraska”); how to allocate the
donated funds between these two proposals was left to their Nebraskan allies. Then again,
Mr. O’Keefe must have known more than he was ready to admit. For it was his own wife,
Ms. Leslie Graves, who started “Renewal Voter Outreach,” the Wisconsin based company
that was paid $1.4 million to gather signatures for the two Nebraska petitions (Aksamit &
Goodsell, 2006).
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As mentioned, some 137,000 signatures were collected in the summer of 2006.
However, the collection was subsequently contested by the State of Nebraska, which had
reason to believe that a significant number of the signatures were not valid such that the HCA
did not meet the level of support required by Nebraska law (Gale, 2006). A constitutional
amendment requires signatures of 10% of the total number of voters who have registered for
the upcoming general election at which the proposed measure will appear on the ballot. In
addition, the signatures must represent at least 40% of Nebraska's 93 counties, and in each of
those counties, signatures must equal at least 5% of the registered voters. The measure was,
therefore, not placed on the ballot for the November 2006 elections. Court proceedings
ensued and dragged out over more than a year. Finally in March of 2008, the NHCC decided
to withdraw its opposition to the State’s refusal to accept all 137,000 signatures. The NHCC
officially dissolved on February 4, 2008 (Nebraska Accountability and Disclosure
Committee, 2008). Why the NHCC did so after spending so much money and fighting such a
protracted battle remains unclear, though lack of further out-of-state funding appears to have
been a consideration (Deputy for Elections, Office of the Nebraska Secretary of State,
personal communication, March 7, 2008).
Lessons to be Learned
Throughout the history of medicine, those concerned about medical-ethical issues
have attempted to regulate the behavior of physicians through the power of law. With the
rather sudden and dramatic increase in medicine’s effectiveness over the course of the 20th
century, raising even more ethical questions and quandaries, such attempts at legal regulation
have increased significantly. Some of these laws have successfully protected public interests.
Notable examples are laws on the licensure of health care providers, laws requiring prompt
reporting of highly infectious illnesses, and those regulating the testing of new drugs. But
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many laws attempting to regulate medical practice, and likewise jurisprudential interventions,
have failed to yield truly satisfactory results.
Among the root causes of this failure is the evident fact that the vast majority of
lawyers have neither studied nor practiced medicine or another health care field.
Consequently, they have limited familiarity with the complexities of medical care and health
care systems, the process of medical decision making, the challenge of diagnosing and
treating under conditions of fundamental and inevitable uncertainties, and the nature of the
therapeutic relationship. The reverse is true as well. Health professionals’ knowledge about
the law and legal thinking tends to be very limited. Many either base their decisions on faulty
legal knowledge and exaggerated malpractice fears, or they mistakenly believe that the law
can yield quick solutions for medicine’s thorny normative dilemmas. The aforementioned
problems are further compounded when lay people who attended neither medical nor law
school, such as most legislators or (in the case of a public referendum) the public at large,
attempt to regulate medical practice with legal instruments.
The former problems are real but not insurmountable for they are practical in nature.
More interdisciplinary courses for medical and law students, and similar continuing education
offerings for practitioners in both professions would be a first step in the right direction.
There is, however, a more foundational problem that concerns the very nature of these
respective practices.
The practice of medicine, though informed by scientific data which enjoy a certain
degree of objectivity and universal applicability, ultimately is an art. Health care is about
caring for individual patients who are unique. They need treatments and care plans that are
tailored to their particular physical and mental constitutions, their peculiar medical histories,
their subjective experiences and expectations. Thus, medical care is largely a matter of trial
and error, of experimenting and waiting, of adjusting and revising.
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Law, on the other hand, is about universal principles and rules that apply to all people.
It is about non-discrimination, fairness, and equal rights. Nobody can be charged unless there
already exists a codified rule. And although jurisprudential interventions tend to focus on
individual cases, there are strict rules for interpreting and applying the rules of law to
individual cases.
This admittedly overstated comparison between medicine and law underscores how
difficult it is to craft legal answers to medical problems, whether legislative or
jurisprudential. Consider, for example, the issue of precedent. Whenever a particular case is
decided, the court must always bear in mind that its decision in this case will and must have
an impact on similar such cases that may arise in the future, including those that will be
decided by different courts. In contrast, a physician trying to figure out how best to treat Mr.
X does not have to worry how this decision may impact the treatment of future patients. And
while physicians should learn from the successes and failures of past treatments, whether
their own or those performed by other physicians, fairness does not demand that future
patients are treated with the same drug or surgical intervention as past patients were.
These differences between medicine and law explain, at least in part, why the bulk of
codified health law on, for example, end-of-life care only concerns patient decision making
rights (e.g., informed consent, record access, confidentiality, and advance directives). There
are laws on how to make decisions, who shall make decisions, and other such procedural
aspects, but little to nothing on what is a good decision. The really hard, substantive
questions, such as when to forgo further life-sustaining treatment, the admissibility of high
and potentially life-threatening doses of pain killers, the use of terminal sedation, and the
practice of euthanasia are rarely regulated by the law – or if so, in a very dissatisfactory
manner (Ten Have & Welie, 2005).
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When attempts are made to resolve complex medical-ethical quandaries by legal
means, there is a risk of one of two dangers. If an attempt is made to require certain medical
interventions, as happened in the Nebraska Humane Care Amendment, there is the risk of
forcing physicians and other health professionals to provide these treatments even if they do
more harm than good in individual cases. The records from the case of Sheila Pouliot reveal
that many physicians continued to intervene medically in ways that they decried as being
severely harmful to the patient, solely because of legal mandates (Ouellette 2004). The same
is true, though in the reverse, for laws that prohibit medical interventions. The regulations by
the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) that place stiff penalties on physicians who prescribe,
pharmacists who provide narcotics, and nurses who administer in the absence of sound
medical evidence justifying those drugs has also contributed to the undertreatment of dying
patients who are suffering needlessly, even though the real risk of DEA action may be quite
small (Brower 2009; Garrison & Mitty, 2010; Hellman, 2008; Quill & Meier, 2006; Jung &
Reidenberg, 2006).
But it is also precarious if legal regulations completely abstain from any substantive
guidelines, remaining limited to procedures only. The Dutch legalization of euthanasia is a
case in point. In order for euthanizing physicians to be immune from prosecution, they have
to report their cases to one of five review committees. Although these committees are
required by law to assess each case using a set of substantive criteria, the only legally
required source of information the committees have on which to base their assessments is
what the euthanizing physicians themselves decide to report. If a physician reports the
suffering was unbearable and the patient’s wish was free and persistent, the committee has
few grounds for questioning that judgment, which in turn explains why it takes these
committees, on average, only five minutes per case to complete the kind of assessment that
prior to the 2001 decriminalization used to take a full-blown prosecutorial investigation and
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one or more court hearings, typically followed by at least one appeal to a higher court (Ten
Have & Welie, 2005).
It is a folly to consider law and lawyers mere roadblocks to medical progress, or
worse, the enemy of clinicians. It is equally misguided to expect legal solutions for normative
quandaries that are intrinsic to the practice of medicine itself. In the fourth century BC,
Aristotle in his Nichomachean Ethics already warned that one should not expect from a
particular discipline more clarity, precision, or certainty than the subject admits (Aristotle,
1925). This is true of medicine. But so it is of law. Whether, when, and how long medical
treatment, be it resuscitation, narcotics, or artificial nutrition, is indicated for any particular
terminally ill patient is ultimately a medical question, not a legal one. Medical scientists who
develop and apply ever more advanced life-sustaining and life-altering interventions, together
with the patients who will undergo them, must also tackle the normative questions about their
proper use, instead of simply delegating that responsibility to legislatures and courts.
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